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Abstract
            Georgia's banking  system  restructure began in 1991 when Soviet Union 
collopsed.This paper tries to compare and constract the performance of banks and 
banking  system  between  1999  and  2004  with  banks  in  other  transition 
countries.Although  Georgia  banking  system    showed  a  long  processing  in 
banking sector, it is still lags behind other transition countries Central and Eastern 
Europe. Neverthless.An efficient financial institution and performance will not 
come  without  further  economic  development  and  reform  of  regulation  and 
increase in people's confidence in the financial system as a whole.
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Introduction
            A successful implementation of an overall reform program will enable 
Georgian banks to provide intermediation and assist in the country's development 
from a weak market economy to a mature financial system. The changes for 
reform are better now than  at any time during the last decade. Favorable economic 
and political conditions and changes in attitude among  bank management have 
created an usual opportunities for development and   growth. The situation in 
Georgian banks was improved markedly since 1994, so EBRD   increased the 
banking reform marks from +2 points to +3 points. The banks has grown  in terms 
of assets, equity, deposit, loans and profit. The positive development in banking 
sector have taken place with general economic recovery. Table 1 shows the general 
size and development of banking sector, measured as a percentage gross domestic 
product(GDP).Figure1 shows the general transition and banking reform scores for 
Georgia and some other transition countries as measured by the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development(EBRD,Transition report 2003)
            In general, the banking and economic systems changed in parallel with 
economic development. Little happened before mid-decade, but Georgia's overall 
transition (measured as the simple average of the EBRD's eight components of 
reform) converged to the group average for all 25 transition economies by 1997, 
while Georgian bank reform converged to near the group average by the same 
year.
            There are different variety of factors distinguish the transition economies 
in structuring the financial sector development. Although the variety of structuring 
challenges, all transition countries faced the same problems of transforming a few 
state-owned banks into a western-style banking system (Amaghlobeli, Farrell, 
Nielsen).
 An efficient banks and financial institution in transition economies is 
crucial for conversion from plan to market and overall economic growth and 
technological  advancement.  Financial  institution  perfor  unique  task  in  the 
economy by providing liquidity  to business and  households by linking surplus 
holding with deposit spending units.Success of financial institutions perform 
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54these task will largerly depend on the environment in which they operate the 
policies  the  regulatory  authorities  follow  and  the  ability  of  management  to 
efficiently utilize available resourses. (Jaffee, Levian, 2001 )
         
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, various years.
Figure 1. Overall transition and bank reform (BR) scores, all countries and 
Georgia ,1991-2001.
The article is organized as follow: First, It examines current performance in 
Georgia, following which market structure and concentration are analysed.Next 
section , compare major development of Georgia with other transition countries, 
then conclusion. Banking sector in Georgia is in need of reform.Why?Reason 
first, the ability to sustain the positive economic gains made in the last few years 
depend  , to a large extent on a well functioning banking sector.The current system 
cannot  adeguately support economic growth as very little to its  activity consists 





          In an efficient banking system, each of these services will be supplied up to 
the level at which the marginal benefit to banks customers equals the marginal cost 
to the bank of providing the services.
         Second ,sharp increase in foreign direct investment inflow ($315 million), 
being incapable of facilitating  an efficient allocation of  these capital inflows, the 
banking sector  will try to cope with this liquidity influse by building up assets 
through increased lending an investment porfolio  and of building up asset prices. 
The biggest protection against  such a scenorio would be a strong  competant and 
efficient banking sector.
General Overview of Georgia
           After declaring independence in 1991 Georgia experienced a particulary 
deep recession.From 1991 to 1994 GDP dropped by more than 70% (45 % in 1992 
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55respectively(  Wang  1999).  Transformation  of  recession  is  common  to  all 
transition economies.Output decreased, inflation increased and unemployment  
increased.There were two secessionist wars, including political  turmoil retared 
the economic recovery with getting political stabilization by  mid-1994, counrty 
begin to implement the program of comprehensive reform with external assistant 
from IMF, the World Bank, Technical Aid for CIS(TACIS)   and others.GDP 
increased by 11% in 1997, 10 % in 1998 inflation was only 7% in 1997,  GDP 11,1 
% recently ($ 3,73 billion)GDP growth moderated to around 3 % in 1998 ,  partly 
as a result of the Asian and Russisan financial system.(EBRD, Transition report )
Structure Stratage of Banking System
Banking reform in georgia started in the late 1980s when the country was 
still a part of the soviet union, but substantive changes accored only after the 
country gained independence.In 1991 a two-tier banking system was introduced 
when the Gosbank branch in Georgia became the national bank of Georgia(NBG) 
and five state-owned specialized bank (Eximbank, Sberbenk, Agropnombank, 
Promstoibank  and  Zhilsotsbank)  were  privatized.Altough    new  legislation   
established the NBG as an independent supervisory, regulatory and monetary 
body, most of its practices inherited from soviet planning program.NBG was 
obliged to autometically finance government deficit and administer direct credits 
and ,until december 1992, the NBG continue to provide loans to state-owned 
enterprises. . ( Gurgenidze, 1995 )
              Banking issues have usually dominated the reform agenda in transition 
economies because   banks tend to be largest part of financial system in most 
transition economies and because banks were only financial institution in the past. 
Building a banking system or creation of a new banking system, Georgia choiced 
the second route, most of Central Europe have mostly pursued the first route. The 
main two approaches to banking reform can consequently be characterize as 
rehabilization and new entry approaches. The rehabilitation  is best illustrated by 
Hungary and Poland, transforming of existing state bank  eventually privatize 
them. (Alimkulov, 1999)
The main sequence of the new entry   approach to banking   generally 
consist of following stages: the split-up of the mono-bank into a number of state-
owned commercial banks, but then follows with the liberal entry of new banks and 
privatization of state banks (Chart 1).
Chart1
NEW ENTRY APPROACH TO THE BANKING REFORM
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56Although Claessens (1996) argues that the institutional development of 
banking systems may be faster under the new entry approach than under the 
rehabilitation approach FSU countries still have the banking systems with a lower 
9 level of financial intermediation than CEE countries.  This may explain by weaker 
initial conditions, macroeconomic instability and inconsistent reform measures in 
FSU countries. The high spreads between loan and deposit rates, especially in FSU 
countries, show again that the activity of banks in FSU countries is extremely 
inefficient in comparison with CEE countries.
Banking stage  after 1997
           NBG certified the United Georgian Bank and the Bank of Georgia in mid-
1997. Reserve requirements were lowered and the capital adequacy standard was 
raised from 8 to 10% of total assets. As a result of the BCP and stricter regulations, 
173 commercial banks (of 226) had vanished in less than 3 years. As noted by Kloc 
(1999), this was an unprecedented outcome among the nations of the former 
Soviet Union.As it is illustrated in figure2 , number of banks decreased as more 
strong bank regulation implemented.
          Late 1997 brought the next stage of reform when the NBG announced a 
plan to gradually increase the minimum capital requirement for commercial banks 
to GEL 5,000,000 (approximately $3,846,000) by the end of 2000. This measure 
aimed to further consolidate the industry by eliminating the smaller and weaker 
banks. Throughout 1998 the NBG was involved in revoking licenses of banks not 
meeting the new minimum capital requirements and other prudential regulations. 
Although initially stymied by a court challenge, the issue was resolved in favor of 
the NBG and de-licensing resumed. By the end of the year a total of 10 banks had 
lost their licenses.(Amaghlobeli, Farrell, Nielsen,2003
             Source: EBRD (2001) and National Bank of Georgia (2001).
Figure 2. Commercial banks in Georgia, 1991-2001.
           Late 1997 brought the next stage of reform when the NBG announced a 
plan to gradually increase the minimum capital requirement for commercial 
banks to GEL 5,000,000 (approximately $3,846,000) by the end of 2000. This 
measure aimed to further consolidate the industry by eliminating the smaller and 
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57banks not meeting the new minimum capital requirements and other prudential 
regulations. Although  initially  stymied  by  a  court  challenge,  the  issue  was 
resolved in favor of the NBG and de-licensing resumed. By the end of the year a 
total of 10 banks had lost their licenses.(Amaghlobeli, Farrell, Nielsen,2003)
Table 1. Commercial banks grouped by paid-up authorised capital (GEL and %)
Source: National Bank of Georgia data (2001) 
The  Russian  financial  crisis  of  1998  adversely  affected  commercial 
banking in Georgia. The GEL was devalued by about 40% from November to 
December, bank deposits dropped and GDP growth slowed from 6% in the first 
half of 1998 to between 1 and 2% in the second half. Nonetheless, the nation's 
banking system managed to maintain an adequate financial position and even 
though the NBG prepared a plan to assist banks, only two banks asked for short-
term liquidity loans in the total amount of GEL 4 million.
 By 2000 the NBG had achieved total compliance with the new minimum 
capital requirements in step with the established timetable. As a result, the number 
of commercial banks had dropped to 26 by the end of 2001 and the size structure 
of the banking system had radically changed (see Figure 2 and Table 1).
  Asset and liability of banks
           As shown in Table 2, between 1995 and 2000 the percentage of total bank 
assets held in loans decreased by almost 10%, while the percentage held in 
accounts with correspondent banks increased almost six-fold. As interest rate 
spreads were decreasing sharply during this period, commercial banks sought to 
secure non-loan sources of revenue involving currency conversion and especially 
money transfers (both domestic and international). Banks started maintaining 
multiple correspondent accounts with other banks in the country and abroad, 
which came at the expense of lending. On the liability side, a substantial increase 
in capital can be observed as well as a corresponding decrease in the percentage of 
demand deposits. As public confidence in the banks increased, both time deposits 
and household deposits increased more than six-fold. .(Amaghlobeli, Farrell, 
Nielsen,2003)










Over  5 
mln 
Over 
10 mln  Total 
1998  40  6  5  1  0  1  0  53 
1999  1  10  12  4  5  5  0  37 
2000  0  0  0  5  20  7  0  32 
2001  0  0  0  0  6  24  0  30 
2005  0  0  0  0  0  13  6  19 
2006-
January  0  0  0  0  0  13  6  19 
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58Table 2. Asset and liability composition of the banking sector, 1995-2000 (%)
Source: National Bank of Georgia (2000).
            Growth in commercial bank lending in Georgia was primarily due to trade 
(see Figure 3). In 2000 this sector accounted for close to 70% of total loans (see 
Table 3), followed by manufacturing (19%), construction (6%) and agriculture 
  (5%).Almost all banks in the country provide financing for retail and wholesale 
merchants  because  such  loans  are  short-term  and  carry  higher  than  average 
interest rates. The share of manufacturing and construction doubled between 1996 
and 2000, while the share of agriculture, transport and other services (which 
includes services of caterers, hotels, petrol stations, barbers' shops etc.) dropped 
sharply. 
           The growth in manufacturing lending was mostly driven by agricultural 
processing and light industry traditional sectors in the Georgian economy. These 
industries required relatively small-scale and short-term loans that banks were 
ready to provide. Heavy industry, however, remained substantially deprived of 
borrowing opportunities since it requires investments with long maturities and 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 








7.1  5.7  4.9  3.7  5.5  5 
Foreign currency accounts  5  4.8  5.7  4.5  3.7  4.7 
Accountswith  correspondent 
banks 
2.6  10  10.8  18.3  13.8  13.4 
Debtors  2.5  3.5  2.9  3.1  2.6  2.3 
Loans  64.2  50.6  50.7  48  50.7  55 
Claims on banks  1.7  3.6  2.4  1  0.9  0.8 
Securities  0.2  1.2  2.3  2.1  3.3  2.1 
Fixed assets and premises  12.4  14.5  14.5  15.8  13  12.2 
Other assets  1.4  2.4  1.5  1.4  4.4  2.7 
Total Assets  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Authorised capital  15.1  25  28.1  24.4  22.5  24.4 
Other funds  6.7  6.8  7.6  10.2  10.4  13.1 
Foreign currency accounts  16.4  20.8  23  12.7  13.7  14.8 
Other bank accounts  0.7  1.6  3.6  1.4  1.7  1 
Transaction deposits  17.1  18.1  12.4  8.9  6.6  7.4 
Term deposits  0.1  0.5  2  4.2  4.8  4 
Other banks' loans  28.1  19.3  15.8  21.8  21.2  18.8 
Other creditors  9  2.8  2.4  2 2  1.9  1.2 
Deposits of households  2.2  2.9  3  8.9  10.5  13.9 






0.9  3.1  0.5 
Other liabilities  5.5  2.4  2.1  4.1  2.9  2.1 
Budgetary resources  0  0  0.1  0.3  0.6  0.5 
Total Liabilities  100  100  100  100  100  100 
 
IBSU International Refereed Multi-diciplinary Scientific Journal ?  1, 2006
59high risk.
     Table 3. Sector shares in total bank loan portfolio, 1996-2000 (%)
Source: National Bank of Georgia (2000) 
Source: National Bank of Georgia (2000).
Figure 3. Bank loans by industrial sector, 1996-2000 (000 GEL).
Quality of Loan
           The prevalence of bad loans and the term structure of loans are general 
indicators of lending quality. As for bad loans, their share in the total bank loan 
portfolio was about 6.9% in 2000, down from over 40% just 5 years earlier. The 
high percentage of the middle 1990s reflects output collapse, a deteriorating 
payments system, bad loans inherited from both the communist past and the early 
transition years, a lack of credit risk assessment skills and, first and foremost, 
allocation of credit according to non-commercial considerations (Gurgenidze, 
1995).  The  economic  recovery,  the  full  write-off  of  old  bad  loans,  the 
privatization  of  state-owned  banks  and  the  improvement  in  the  payments 
discipline and credit assessment skills of loan officers evidently helped bring 
down the share of non-performing loans 
         Turning to the term structure of loans, it is common knowledge that in the 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
Agriculture  13.5  6.9  4.2  5.3  4.7 
Manufacturing  9.9  12.9  21.0  18.7  18.6 
Electric utilities  1.8  1.5  2.2  1.1  1.8 
Construction  3.4  3.4  5.5  6.9  6.2 
Trade  23.3  20.8  64.0  62.5  67.4 
Transport and communications  1.0  0.8  1.0  3.6  0.0 
Other services  47.1  53.7  2.1  2.0  1.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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60early transition years most lending was short-term. Georgia is no exception to the 
rule. However, over time the share of long-term loans in the total loan portfolio 
increased considerably: in mid-1998 about 13% of loans were long-term, but by 
the end of 2000 this share had increased to 26% (see Figure 5). Dollarisation 
inhibited faster growth of long-term loans. Borrowers with loans denominated in 
US dollars prefer to keep them short-term for fear that the depreciation of the lari 
will induce exchange rate losses. On the other hand, lenders are also unwilling to 
take  excessive  exchange  rate  risk  by  supplying  longer-term  credits  in  lari. 
.(Amaghlobeli, Farrell, Nielsen,2003)
Source: National Bank of Georgia (2000) and authors' calculations.
Figure 4. Long-term loan share of total loans, 1998-2000 (%).
 Evolution of state ownership
          Among CIS countries only Armenia and Georgia have been able to fully 
eliminate state ownership in the banking sector, while the Kyrgyz Republic has 
only three state banks accounting for about 10% of the system's assets (Table 4). 
Kazakhstan has been able to substantially reduce the share of state bank assets 
since 1998, and Moldova's banking sector will be fully privatized as soon as the 
state shares in the former savings bank are sold. Tajikistan privatized four of its 
five state banks by 1998, accompanied with the government program prohibiting 
further direct lending
 Ukraine at the end of 2004 had two state banks, whose assets accounted for 
about  14%  of  the  sectoral  total. Although  the  huge  state  agricultural  bank 
"Ukrayina"  underwent  liquidation  in  2001,  the  share  of  state  banks  has  not 
dropped since, and has even slightly increased. This is somewhat surprising, since 
one of the two state banks is the loss-making Oschadny (savings) bank. Experts 
question  whether  Oschadny  can  become  competitive  without  significant 
assistance from the government. Preliminary estimates in early 2001 indicated 
that Oschadny would need to reduce its costs by about 40% in order to be 
profitable (Sherif et al., 2001).
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61Source: EBRD Transition Report
Ukraine at the end of 2004 had two state banks, whose assets accounted for 
about  14%  of  the  sectoral  total. Although  the  huge  state  agricultural  bank 
"Ukrayina" underwent liquidation in 2001, the share of state banks has not 
dropped since, and has even slightly increased. This is somewhat surprising, since 
one of the two state banks is the loss-making Oschadny (savings) bank. Experts 
question  whether  Oschadny  can  become  competitive  without  significant 
assistance from the government. Preliminary estimates in early 2001 indicated 
that Oschadny would need to reduce its costs by about 40% in order to be 
profitable (Sherif et al., 2001).
Banking  sectors  in  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Russia,  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan remain dominated by large state banks (Table 1). Still, on average, 
assets of state banks have been declining since the mid-1990s, thanks mainly to 
the large scale privatization or liquidation of state banks in countries like Georgia, 
Kazakhstan,  and  Kyrgyzstan.  The  introduction  and  better  enforcement  of 
prudential standards is combining with competition to favor more efficient private 
banks.
Bank dominance and development of stock markets
            Non-banking financial institutions are in a rudimentary state in the CIS, 
dwarfed in importance by commercial banks. Only in Russia, Kazakhstan, and the 
Kyrgyz Republic has stock market size remained comparable to banks' size. In 
developed countries both bank and non-bank financial institutions play more 
Table  4.  Asset  share  of  state  owned  banks  for  selected  transition 
economies. 1995 - 2002, end of a year, % of total banking sector assets 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Armenia  2.4  3.2  3.4  5.7  3.5  3.8  0.0 
Azerbaijan  80.5  77.6  80.9  65.5  82.5  60.4  62.0 
Belarus  62.3  54.1  55.2  59.5  66.6  66.0  53.2 
Georgia  48.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Kazakhstan  24.3  28.4  44.8  23.0  19.9  1.9  3.5 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
69.7  5.0  10.3  10.4  25.8  15.8  16.6 
Moldova        0.3  7.9  9.8  10.2 
Tajikistan    5.3  30.3  29.2  6.9  6.8  4.8 
Turkmenistan  26.1  64.1  68.3  77.8  96.9  97.1  96.5 
Russia      37.0  41.9    44.1   
Ukraine      13.5  13.7  12.5  11.9  11.8 
Uzbekistan  38.4  75.5  70.6  67.3  65.8  77.5  96.0 
Latvia  9.9  6.9  6.8  8.5  2.6  2.9  3.2 
Poland  71.7  69.8  51.6  48.0  24.9  23.9  24.4 
Hungary  49.0  15.3  3.5  9.8  7.8  7.7  9.1 
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62significant roles. Market capitalization of listed companies (commonly used as a 
proxy for stock market size) is comparable to the size of total deposits with 
banking financial institutions.(Golodniuk,2005)
Figure 1 illustrates also the small size of financial intermediation in the CIS 
compared to advanced transition economies.
World Bank, IMF International Financial Statistics.
Bank Credit and Deposits
       Banks' abilities to attract deposits are improving and bank deposits are 
steadily growing in all countries, except Turkmenistan and Belarus (Figure 7). 
This growth is most remarkable in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Moldova. Deposit 
trends indicate that public trust in the banks is recovering after Russian financial 
crisis events and the trend persists.
Figure7. Dynamics of bank deposits, CIS, 1997- 2003, end year 
Source: WDI World Bank.
         1997       1998           1999        2000          2001           2002              2003
The literature finds a positive relationship between credits to the private 
sector and economic growth, because decisions about crediting the private sector 
are generally made on the basis of economic rather than political considerations. 
With the exception of Turkmenistan, Belarus, and the Kyrgyz Republic, shares of 
credits allocated to the private sector have been steadily increasing (Figure 8).

























  Georgia   Russia   Kazakhstan   Kyrgyz Republic  
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63Interest rate spread
        The difference between interest rates earned on credits and offered on 
deposits  shows  a  bank's  efficiency  as  a  financial  intermediary.  This  spread 
measures the proportion of funds raised from crediting that is absorbed by the 
banking system, rather than acquired by the investor (owner of a deposit). The 
interest rate spread has been persistently diminishing since 1997 in all countries of 
the region. The only exception is Turkmenistan, where the interest rate is not 
meaningful  as  such  since  banks  operate  as  payment  agents  to  subsidize  the 
economy from the Central Bank of Turkmenistan.
Source: World development indicators, World Bank
           The declining spread is an extremely positive development. First, high 
spreads usually imply high lending rates, which can have substantial adverse 
economic  implications,  especially  for  small  and  medium  sized  enterprises 
(SMEs). Second, declining spreads are most likely associated with the increasing 
competition in the sector. These trends suggest that financial systems in CIS 
economies are moving toward the successful frameworks put in place in the new 
EU member states. Financial sectors are improving their services to enterprises, 
lending has been growing as a percentage of GDP, and economic growth rates are 
solid. Public trust in the financial sector is firming. Interest rate spreads are 
converging toward levels observed in the new EU countries, and such modern 
financial  products  as  payment  cards,  microloans,  and  credit  lines  are  being 
constantly introduced. Regulatory and supervisory standards are also converging 
toward best international practices, although their enforcement is still weak. 
However, because they have not benefited from the extensive foreign direct 
investment that recapitalised banks in Central Europe, financial stability in many 
CIS countries remains an open question.( Golodniuk, 2005)
Table 5. Spread between lending  
and deposit rate 1997-2003, % 
     
  199
7 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Armenia  28.2  23.5  11.5  13.5  11.8  11.5  14.0 
Azerbaijan      7.4  6.8  11.2  8.7  5.9 
Belarus  16.2  12.7  27.2  30.1  12.8  10.0  6.5 
Georgia  36.9  29.0  18.8  22.6  19.5  22.0  23.0 
Hungary  4.8  4.9  4.4  3.1  3.7  2.8  -1.4 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
9.8  37.7  25.3  33.5  24.8  18.9  16.8 
Latvia  9.4  9.0  9.2  7.5  5.9  4.7  2.4 
Moldova  9.9  9.2  8.0  8.9  7.8  9.3  6.7 
Poland  5.6  6.3  5.8  5.8  6.6  5.8  3.6 
Russia  15.3  24.7  26.0  17.9  13.1  10.8  8.5 
Tajikistan  51.6  41.1  21.0  24.3  15.9  5.0  6.9 
Ukraine  30.9  32.2  34.3  27.8  21.3  17.4  10.9 
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Conclusions
          The banking system in Georgia was in complete chaos in 1994. Assets were 
emaciated, bad loans were prominent in bank portfolios, public confidence was 
devastated and banks were subject to no real supervision. The country experienced 
full-scale  disintermediation  that  left  banks  without  attractive  investment 
opportunities and little to invest. On top of all this, banks were often poorly 
managed and corrupt.
         With political and economic consolidation, this desperate state of affairs 
triggered drastic measures from the NBG and the government designed to recreate 
the  banking  industry.  These  measures  have  born  fruit,  including  healthy 
profitability based on normal banking activities of transactions mediation and 
financing, banking consolidation as small and weak banks disappeared and sound 
banks were strengthened, privatisation and foreign ownership, diminution of 
interest spreads and lengthening of loan maturities, extension of banking loans to 
different sectors, development of modern banking by some if not all banks, and 
dramatically  improved  transparency  (publication  of  interest  rates  and  bank 
balance  sheets,  improved  accounting  practices  and  general  financial 
strengthening of banks).
There is also no doubt that macroeconomic stability contributed to the 
healthy development of commercial banking in Georgia. With a new currency and 
stable monetary policy, banks were obliged to focus on the business of banking 
rather than grasping for quick profits afforded by turbulent times Notwithstanding 
significant progress, Georgia ranks very low compared with leading transition 
economies and developed market economies in terms of financial development. It 
ranks about average in terms of financial transition. Dollarisation, reflecting 
wariness  of  banking,  seems  to  be  adding  some  security  to  the  activities  of 
commercial banks, but it seriously lessens the powers of the NBG. Lack of public 
confidence in the national currency and financial institutions also retards financial 
 
Figure 8.Domestic credit to private sector 
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65development.  Banking  is  still  irrelevant  and  distrusted  by  the  bulk  of  the 
population.  Limited  economic  development,  specific  labour  shortages,  still 
primitive accounting and telecommunications systems and the absence of a liquid 
stock market as well as other financial institutions are all barriers to be overcome.
           Banking reform in Georgia is still work in progress. Given Georgia's 
geographical position aside the Silk Route and its ambitions to pursue a transport-
based growth strategy founded on free market institutions, this reform is essential 
work. The role of trust as well as technology means that banking must be modern 
to ensure trade and growth. In the best case, the next decade will bring as much 
change to Georgian banking as the last.
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